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WOMEN AND WHISTLEBLOWING: 
EXPLORING GENDER EFFECTS IN POLICY DESIGN
CLARE TILTON*
Abstract
Laws that incentivize employees to blow the whistle when they perceive a financial 
risk and protect them from retaliation have sharply increased in popularity and have even 
become commonplace at the state level for fraud related to government money. Dodd-
Frank codified a similar kind of protection for whistleblowers who report private-sector 
fraud. This Note suggests that states, especially New York, have an opportunity to propose 
new financial fraud whistleblower legislation in response to the Trump administration’s 
efforts to reduce the federal government’s active regulatory role in the financial sector. 
However, the prevalence and potential of such legislation should inspire a closer look at 
how legal mechanisms target and encourage participation across the employee population. 
Any program that seeks to encourage participation within an existing context, such as the 
financial services workplace, risks entrenching bias and inequality if it fails to consider the 
differential effects of its design across different demographics.
This Note therefore addresses whistleblower laws’ implications for women 
employees’ participation in whistleblowing when they observe financial services sector-
based misconduct. It reviews existing research regarding women’s participation1 in 
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1   This Note addresses gender only in terms of a binary distinction between men and women. This conception 
of gender is unfortunately but necessarily narrow because it reflects the state of the existing research on gender 
effects of whistleblowing mechanisms. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The 
Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 Tex. 
L. Rev. 1151 (2010) [hereinafter Feldman & Lobel, Incentives Matrix] (comparing the responses of men as 
opposed to women in a survey that studied various legal mechanisms, without greater nuance regarding gender 
identity); Michael T. Rehg et al., Antecedents and Outcomes of Retaliation Against Whistleblowers: Gender 
Differences and Power Relationships, 19 ORg. Sci. 221, 235 (2008) (studying the frequency of whistleblowing 
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whistleblowing and considers how that evidence should shape choices of policymakers 
who seek to encourage employee reporting while still fostering workplace environments 
and regulatory structures that value and benefit from women’s voices.
INTRODUCTION
“Whistleblowing,” or an employee’s act of reporting misconduct when he or she 
observes it within an organization, is the result of a complicated calculation on the reporting 
employee’s part. The whistleblower makes the choice to “change, rather than escape from, 
an objectionable state of affairs,”2 and that will only happen when an employee decides that 
the costs that come with reporting wrongdoing do not outweigh the benefits.3 
This Note considers both internal reporting (such as to a company hotline or a 
manager) and external reporting (such as to the government or a media outlet) types of 
whistleblowing. The nature and effects, as well as the moral status and attendant risks, 
of these two kinds of reporting diverge sharply. However, to the extent that existing or 
potential policies attempt to encourage compliance through voluntary private action, the 
frequency of both these kinds of action speaks to policies’ successes. 
Furthermore, the effects of a law like the federal Dodd-Frank Act (“Dodd-Frank”) 
reach beyond the reporting systems that it structures directly—that is, formal reporting to a 
government agency. Rather, an important suggestion based on the academic literature is that 
we should expect laws that explicitly relate only to external reporting to increase the moral 
salience of whistleblowing and therefore impact a broader range of reporting behaviors. 
Therefore, I adopt an expansive whistleblower definition: “organization members . . . who 
disclose illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices . . . to [those] who may be able to effect 
action,”4 regardless of where the “persons or organizations” who receive the reports sit. 
and of retaliation in response to whistleblowing by comparing survey responses of employees identified as 
“men” and “women”).
2   Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis, 
89 ind. L.J. 1069, 1071 n.4 (2014) (citing ALbeRT O. HiRScHmAn, exiT, vOice, And LOyALTy: ReSpOnSeS TO 
decLine in FiRmS, ORgAnizATiOnS, And STATeS 30 (1970)).
3   Id. at 1176. 
4   Norman D. Bishara et. al., The Mouth of Truth, 10 n.y.U. J. L. & bUS., 37, 43 (2013) (citing Granville 
King III, The Effects of Interpersonal Closeness and Issue Seriousness on Blowing the Whistle, 34 J. bUS. 
cOmm. 419, 420–21 (1997)). 
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Whether an individual makes an internal or an external report, regulation and law affect 
the calculation that leads the whistleblower to reach out and report conduct. Laws can 
provide protection from retaliation, assurances of confidentiality, or monetary incentives. 
In fact, state and federal False Claims Act (FCA) legislation,5 as well as Dodd-Frank,6 
have used monetary incentives and inspired controversy among commentators for doing so. 
This Note contemplates the potential effectiveness of a mini Dodd-Frank that implements 
the same policies on a statewide basis, which was a model the New York State Attorney 
General alluded to developing in February 2015.7 Financial incentives for whistleblowers 
therefore figure particularly prominently in the following analysis. 
Policy discussions in cities throughout the country and in liberal-leaning states like New 
York have focused on attempts to counteract and resist Trump administration initiatives that 
have struck a chord and inspired anxiety among local citizens.8 The administration has also 
signaled its willingness to embark on an “extensive effort to loosen regulation on banks 
and other major financial companies.”9 This area presents itself as another opportunity for 
New York’s leaders to wield the state’s power in the opposite, progressive direction of the 
administration’s policies.
Research regarding the current landscape of federal and state whistleblowing legislation 
offers extensive implications for how a thoughtful new law would form. This Note identifies 
and discusses research conclusions regarding women and whistleblowing10 and highlights 
5   Id. at 52.
6   Id. at 49; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010).
7   Press Release, A.G. Schneiderman Proposes Bill To Reward And Protect Whistleblowers Who Report 
Financial Crimes (Feb. 26, 2015), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-proposes-bill-reward-and-
protect-whistleblowers-who-report-financial [perma.cc/8XCR-75F7].
8   Heather Gerken et al., ‘All Resistance Is Local’: A Plan of Progressive Action for the Trump Years, 
THe nATiOn (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/all-resistance-is-local-a-plan-of-progressive-
action-for-the-trump-years/ [perma.cc/AAR4-5H4H] (describing a strategy for liberal-leaning cities and states 
to resist Trump administration policies and specifically highlighting New York Governor Andrew Cuomo’s 
“insiste[nce] that New York will be a ‘refuge’ for Muslims and other minority groups”).
9   Ben Protess & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to Roll Back Obama-Era Financial Regulation, 
n.y. TimeS (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/trump-congress-financial-
regulations.html?_r=0 [perma.cc/J9BR-ZUB6].
10   See generally Feldman & Lobel, Incentives Matrix, supra note 1 (engaging in an extensive survey study 
to ascertain the effects of context, employees’ characteristics, and severity of the observed misconduct on the 
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important takeaways for policymakers attempting to craft a whistleblowing system that 
encourages all employees, regardless of gender, to raise their voices and participate in the 
monitoring mechanisms the law creates.  
This Note attempts to envision the components of a gender-effect-conscious 
whistleblowing policy that could be effectively implemented at the state level. Despite 
existing research, a central conclusion is that further, more specific research into the 
particular circumstances of women in the New York financial services industry would be 
necessary to develop a thorough policy proposal that will achieve this goal. However, 
given what we know, I emphasize that including a duty to report in a whistleblower law 
would potentially serve to enhance women’s participation in workplace reporting. 
Part I situates whistleblowing policy in the broader relevant historical, legal, and 
political context. It addresses the status of whistleblowing in terms of public perception, 
existing law, and the “New Governance” philosophy that has underpinned most twenty-
first century compliance efforts. Evidence of a sea change in state false claims laws in 
particular lends strength to the idea that there is potential for a similar shift in the way 
states deal with damaging financial fraud. Next, Part II describes the extensive social 
science research that indicates that superficially gender-neutral whistleblower mechanisms 
affect men and women differently. Given that research, Part II also considers what gender 
effects we would expect from aspects of the proposed law as it was described in 2015. 
Finally, Part III addresses the question of what the social and legal whistleblowing context 
demands of policymakers concerned with drafting and implementing a whistleblower law 
that will encourage diverse participation. This Part emphasizes the need for a detailed 
inquiry into the context of the financial services industry in particular, in an effort to avoid 
misapplying general conclusions about female employees to the behavior of professional 
women who work in a specific industry and are therefore likely to have had distinct 
experiences. However, Part III also offers suggestions for mechanisms that policymakers 
should consider, given the information that is currently available. 
I.  Current Whistleblower Landscape
A.  Politics and Perception of Whistleblowing
At best, the public responds to whistleblowers as heroes who stand up against powerful 
forces to protect the public interest. But public perception can also feed off of a natural 
likelihood of employees to blow the whistle, given various legal mechanisms).
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distaste for tattletales, leading to distrust and a perception that whistleblowers report for 
selfish, destructive reasons.11 Interviews on the subject indicate that the public is inconsistent 
in its evaluation of whistleblowers. Interviews led to subjects admitting that the category 
includes the quintessential brave reporter, but they also reflected an expectation that some 
whistleblowers are disgruntled employees or slightly unhinged troublemakers.12 Fear of 
such accusatory or derogatory responses to whistleblowing weigh on employees deciding 
whether to report on misconduct.
 
On one hand, employees may worry about explicit retaliation from inside their 
organizations, including demotion and firing. Corporations and public organizations alike 
at least present a pro-whistleblower attitude in many cases, encouraging employees to 
report wrongdoing in order to bolster performance.13 However, actual employees respond 
not to those formal messages but to accounts of previous whistleblowers’ negative 
experiences and to the realities of power dynamics within organizations, which discourage 
participation. According to one whistleblower advocate, the employees thinking about 
reporting assume “the fact that adverse consequences are generally not assured but their 
occurrence is probabilistically determined.”14 Employees are conditioned to understand 
that any product or company action comes with some kind of risk, and that is built into 
their work in some way. The risk of retaliation based on a whistleblowing tip that receives 
a hostile response, though, is actually more difficult to manage by comparison.15 Research 
indicates that these concerns structure not just whether but also how a reporter blows the 
whistle. Employees who fear retaliation from superiors may turn to external reporting in an 
effort to find protections that they do not see within their organizations.16 
11   Bishara et al., supra note 4, at 7 (“[L]egislators often seem ambivalent about rewarding ‘tattle-tales.’ 
Some commentators, as well, have derisively referred to rewards paid to whistleblowers as “bounties” that may 
encourage whistleblowers to report wrongdoing externally, rather than within the organization, to maximize 
personal reward.”).
12   Milton Heumann, The World of Whistleblowing: From Jiminy Cricket to the Wicked Witch of the West 
56–67 (Feb. 16, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://works.bepress.com/milton_heumann/1/ [perma.cc/
T6HW-JRBA]. 
13   Id. at 50–52.
14   Id. at 51–52.
15   Id.
16   Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Whistle-Blowing: Myth and Reality, 22 J. mgmT. 507, 509–10 (1996).
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But well-known whistleblowers’ experiences in the past have indicated even more 
far-reaching negative effects that follow from reporting. Beyond discrete incidents of 
job loss, retaliation against whistleblowers can include isolation in the workplace.17 The 
cost of whistleblowing can reach to family strife and long-term financial well-being. The 
risk of psychological consequences and anxieties that come with reporting should not be 
understated: whistleblowers as a whole tend to suffer from alcoholism and depression.18
Conflicting ideas about whistleblower motivations characterize social attitudes toward 
whistleblowers. Public discourse can paint whistleblowers as heroes or snitches,19 selfish or 
altruistic.20 The overview of existing whistleblower laws can also be interpreted to reflect 
that range of ideas about whistleblower motivation.
B.  Current Law at the State Level
To understand what the addition of a law that covers and encourages reporting on 
financial wrongdoing would mean, it is important to appreciate the current, limited 
applicable whistleblowing law in New York. While N.Y. Labor Law § 740 covers public 
and private employees, it is written to apply only to reports that implicate public health or 
safety. 21 
The courts have interpreted the “danger” requirement narrowly, and, despite the central 
position of the financial services industry in the state, reports of “financial improprieties” 
17   Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year 2002: The Whistleblowers, Time, Dec. 30, 2002. 
See also Heumann, supra note 12, at 58 for a discussion of one military whistleblower whose moral stance led 
to community isolation.
18   See generally Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 17. Demonstrating the public perception of whistleblowing’s 
professional and personal risks, TIME reported that “whistle-blowers don’t have an easy time,” that “[i]f they 
aren’t fired, they’re cornered: isolated and made irrelevant,” and that “[e]ventually many suffer from alcoholism 
or depression.” Id.
19   Bishara et al., supra note 4, at 95.
20   Heumann, supra note 12, at 57–64. 
21   The law defines employer as “any person, firm, partnership, institution, corporation, or association that 
employs one or more employees.” The public health and safety factor comes through in the requirement that the 
activity the whistleblower reports on “presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety.” 
n.y. LAb. LAw § 740 (McKinney 2017); see also Barker v. Peconic Landing at Southold, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 
564, 567 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). When it applies, the law affords anti-retaliation protections to whistleblowers when 
reports implicate a matter of public health or safety. There are no financial incentives embedded in the law.
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do not garner protection against retaliation under § 740.22 The law also steers away from 
more controversial mechanisms, dealing only with anti-retaliation rather than including a 
framework for monetary incentives or a duty to report. 
1.  Monetary Incentives in Whistleblower Statutes Today
Monetary incentives inspire suspicious criticism founded on the possibility that 
whistleblowers will come forward “to maximize personal reward.”23 However, despite 
those criticisms, thirty years on, commentators are comfortable calling the “effectiveness of 
the [Federal False Claims Act]”—which includes opportunities for whistleblowers to gain 
personal awards—“evident.”24 The federal version of the law has inspired state legislatures 
in thirty-one states, including New York, to develop similar structures.25
State False Claims Acts (“FCAs”) are the only state-level examples of financial 
incentive mechanisms in current law. By focusing on claims for government funds, these 
provisions all benefit from a public-service ethos. State-level FCAs, like the Federal version 
of the law, provide for whistleblower awards through qui tam suits, using a two-plaintiff 
structure.26 In this model, private citizens (usually employees of the defendants) file on 
behalf of the government claiming that a federal contractor has defrauded a government 
entity. Depending on the circumstances of the suit, a qui tam plaintiff may receive between 
ten percent and thirty percent of the award in a successful claim. The New York State False 
Claims Act tracks with the federal law’s guidelines.27 
The FCA regime embeds flexibility and discretion in the recovery process, and those 
22   Barker, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 570.
23   Bishara et al., supra note 4, at 64; See also Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Incentives: Making 
Corporate Whistleblowing Moral In The New Era Of Dodd-Frank Act “Bounty Hunting,” 45 cOnn. L. Rev. 
483, 486–87 (2012) (expressing concern that the Dodd-Frank Act, as written “appeals without apology to an 
informant’s greed”).
24   Bishara et. al., supra note 4, at 63.
25   Of the forty states with False Claims Acts, thirty-one of them, and Washington, D.C., provide for 
whistleblowers to gain personal monetary rewards. Id. at 61.
26   In qui tam actions, a statute allows for a private citizen to sue a defendant for violating a public law. In 
such a case, the private person and a government entity each receive a portion of the penalty if the defendant is 
found liable. Qui Tam Action, bLAck’S LAw dicTiOnARy (10th ed. 2014).
27   n.y. STATe Fin. LAw § 190(6) (McKinney 2017) (setting the range of possible awards between fifteen 
and thirty percent). 
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mechanisms provide opportunities to prevent some of most distasteful, gross stereotypes 
of whistleblowers from being associated with the system. The law provides meaningful 
mechanisms for the government to monitor and adjust whistleblowers’ awards based on the 
conditions of the fraud they reported. For example, if an individual carries on with a claim 
that the government itself would have abandoned, then they will garner at least twenty-five 
percent of the final claim.28 But the law also builds in specific discretion for the court to 
reduce the award in the event that the whistleblower “planned or initiated the violation . . . 
upon which the action was brought.”29 These discretion-granting provisions, coupled with 
the law’s substantive focus on claims against the government, ensures that whistleblowers 
who profit from reporting their employers are likely to remain moral actors in the eyes of 
the public.
Currently, state legislatures across the country demark which reports constitute 
whistleblowing valuable enough to warrant a reward using a public service element as a 
heuristic for ethical value. However, a glance at the history of state FCAs demonstrates that 
legislatures’ conception of appropriate whistleblower policy is not static and can in fact 
evolve rapidly, given the right conditions. There were very few state-level FCA copycats 
in the years immediately following the 1986 Federal False Claims Act revision that added 
qui tam claims in the federal version of the law.30 However, development in this brand of 
whistleblower law happened quickly and recently. By 2004, nineteen states had FCA laws 
that provided substantial rewards to qui tam plaintiffs, and today, more than thirty have 
codified similar rules.31 
A state-level whistleblower law that covers reporting on financial fraud would make 
New York an outlier if the proposal gains traction now. But the wave of state-level FCAs 
seen in the last two decades provides a realistic example of states responding to well-
received federal whistleblower regulation by mimicking its provisions. The result was 
a sea change in whistleblower protection throughout the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, and regulation addressing financial fraud could be the next arena for a similar 
transformation. 
28   Id.
29   Id. at § 190(8).
30   Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower Protection, 38 
Am. bUS. L.J. 99, 110 (2000) (“[In 2000, only] two states, Illinois and Florida, offer[ed] significant rewards for 
whistleblowing through a false claims-type statute.”) (footnotes omitted).
31   Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, States of Pay: Emerging Trends in State Whistleblower Bounty Schemes, 54 
S. Tex. L. Rev. 53, 61, 75 (2012). 
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2.  Dodd-Frank in Application
The Dodd-Frank Act provides the only example of a financial incentive program for 
whistleblowers in the financial services industry. It tracks with the FCA’s whistleblower 
incentives, providing for a “[t]en to thirty percent reward for original information that leads 
to monetary sanction under any securities law” and builds on pre-existing anti-retaliation 
protections in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.32 The law allows for whistleblower awards without 
a dual-plaintiff structure, and it implicitly expands the range of whistleblower activity that 
the federal government deems valuable enough to warrant not only protection but financial 
incentive. 
Culturally and strategically, that expansion was a response to the 2008 financial crisis 
and a “reaction to the role of corporate malfeasance in sparking [the crisis].”33 Dodd-Frank 
opened the door to redefining financial misconduct as not just immoral but dangerous to the 
public. We might understand the Trump administration’s deregulation rhetoric as an attempt 
to revise that approach as a matter of attitude as well as policy. Specific acts to revise or 
reverse Dodd-Frank provisions have come more slowly than the administration’s earlier 
language indicated the country could expect.34 But administration-backed legislation that 
has earned attention from Congress takes aim at the law’s current structure, specifically 
loosening banking regulations.35 
Under Dodd-Frank, eight whistleblowers earned rewards in 2015. The awards total 
thirty-seven million dollars, with thirty million dollars going to just one whistleblower. 
Since August 2011, the Commission has received a total of 116 whistleblower tips. About 
half of the whistleblowers who received awards gave tips that led to the opening of a 
new investigation, and the other half significantly contributed to existing investigations. 
The SEC considers a variety of factors in determining the award the reporting employee 
32   Bishara et al., supra note 4, at 62. 
33   Id. at 41.
34   An Assessment of the White House’s Progress on Deregulation, THe ecOnOmiST (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.
economist.com/news/business/21730170-donald-trump-has-blocked-new-regulations-ease-repealing-old-
ones-will-be-harder [perma.cc/42AW-AJWA] (arguing that the administration’s work on financial deregulation 
has, in fact, been “more thoughtful than zealous” and describing several administration reports on financial 
regulation published by the fall of 2017).
35   Renae Merle, House Passes Sweeping Legislation to Roll Back Banking Rules, wASH. pOST (June 9, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/06/08/house-to-vote-on-sweeping-rollback-of 
-banking-rules/ [perma.cc/77F7-UDAP].
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garners, which allows case-by-case flexibility.36 Attempting to use internal channels before 
reporting to the SEC weighs in favor of the whistleblower. 
B.  Considerations for Whistleblower Design and Organizational Equality
Lessons from past important revisions in whistleblower financial regulation law indicate 
that, given the state-level resistance to the current presidential administration, progressive 
states like New York have the opportunity to reorient standards for whistleblower provisions 
in their jurisdictions. Contrary to existing state whistleblower law, a “mini-Dodd-Frank” 
would embody a reassessment of how serious and destructive financial fraud can be. While 
existing New York State protections and their accompanying case law provide no avenue 
for expanding protected whistleblowing action by broadening the state’s definition of a 
“threat to public health or safety,”37 the proposed Act, like Dodd-Frank, would in effect 
elevate some kinds of financial fraud to a position that more closely resembles public 
health threats. Attorney General Schneiderman’s office was contemplating this goal by 
2015, when it proposed the New York State Financial Frauds Whistleblower Act. The 
proposal’s structure was similar to the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions: it covered 
whistleblowers who report fraud in “banking, insurance and financial services industries” 
and also included anti-retaliation protections.38
As New York and other states turn to options for productive and creative financial 
regulation, looking for new ways to challenge and alleviate the effects of policies at 
the federal level, a state law of this kind has potential to be a valuable tool. However, 
at this stage, years into a respected FCA regime at the state level, it is appropriate for 
state policymakers to look critically at the way the whistleblower mechanisms they choose 
may systematically raise or depress the voices of particular workers. The “business case” 
36   Factors to consider include: “whether the information allowed [the agency] to bring: (1) [A] successful 
action in significantly less time or with significantly fewer resources; (2) additional successful claims; or (3) 
successful claims against additional individuals or entities.” Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions 
of Section 21F, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 34325 (May 25, 2011). 
37   McGrane v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1044, 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
38   Press Release, A.G. Schneiderman Proposes Bill, supra note 7. The design mimics the Dodd-Frank Act 
in that a potential award can be determined on a sliding scale from ten to thirty percent of the claim against 
the wrongdoer. The Act would also ensure the confidentiality of employee’s report and provide anti-retaliation 
protections that cover “discharging, demoting, suspending or harassing employees that report on suspicious or 
fraudulent activity.” Erick Naing, New York AG Pushes Financial Whistleblower Bill, cQ ROLL cALL, 2015 WL 
826247 at 1 (Feb. 27, 2015).
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for diverse participation is an increasingly common refrain in the professional world.39 
Thought leaders in business cite evidence that companies perform better when “gender-
balanced” teams lead on projects to argue that diversity is an “economic issue” that “can 
benefit business and economic performance, thereby impacting all stakeholders.”40 Surely, 
a similarly diverse cohort of engaged employees reporting on serious wrongdoing would 
also be vital. But beyond the instrumentalist arguments for gender diversity is a more basic 
question of whistleblowing legitimacy as a form regulatory policymaking. 
Effective whistleblowing structures allow for employee networks to effectively fill 
in for government parties in their monitoring capacity. Government does not have the 
resources or the expertise to track and respond to the range of wrongdoing that might go 
on in a financial services company. At best, when internal reporting leads to immediate 
responses from corporate managers, a robust whistleblowing structure removes a portion 
of the burden of both monitoring and enforcement from government agencies. And when 
corporate managers support the reported wrongdoing or are unwilling to remedy it, external 
whistleblowing draws government resources to those areas where they are most needed. 
In recognizing that government-structured whistleblower laws serve a function that 
was exclusive to government agencies and based almost entirely on affirmative regulation 
in previous generations,41 the need to thoroughly consider the impact of mechanisms on 
39   Sangeeta Bharadwaj Badal, The Business Benefits of Gender Diversity, gALLUp bUS. J. (Jan. 20, 2014), 
http://www.gallup.com/businessjournal/166220/business-benefits-gender-diversity.aspx [perma.cc/A9LY-
RWRU] (finding that “gender-diverse business units have better financial outcomes than those dominated by 
one gender” in study of more than 800 business units in two companies in retail and hospitality); Marcus 
Noland & Tyler Moran, Study: Firms with More Women in the C-Suite Are More Profitable, HARv. bUS. Rev. 
(Feb. 8, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/02/study-firms-with-more-women-in-the-c-suite-are-more-profitable 
[perma.cc/UK6A-X3YY] (finding advantage to firms with more women in leadership roles or “the C-suite” in 
global survey of nearly 22,000 firms  and specifically finding that “going from having no women in corporate 
leadership (the CEO, the board, and other C-suite positions) to a 30% female share is associated with a one-
percentage-point increase in net margin—which translates to a 15% increase in profitability for a typical firm.”).
40   Michel Landel, Why Gender Balance Can’t Wait, HARv. bUS. Rev. (Mar. 8, 2016), http://hbr.org/2016/03/
why-gender-balance-cant-wait [perma.cc/V7KW-PP2M] (describing a study of the author’s own company, 
Sodexo, which indicated that teams with gender-balanced management perform better on a number of scales, 
including generating profit and client satisfaction).
41   See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Decentralized Enforcement in Organizations: An Experimental 
Approach, 2 Reg. gOveRnAnce 165, 168 (2008) [hereinafter Feldman & Lobel, Decentralized Enforcement] 
and Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought, 89 minn. L. Rev. 342, 344 (2004) for a description of how the whistleblower role aligns with the 
New Governance paradigm, which shifts policy from expert-devised, “command and control” regulation to 
decentralized, bottom-up collaboration.
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participation becomes more urgent. Where business leaders’ efforts at gender-balanced 
participation can be defended, and championed, on the basis of their companies’ bottom 
lines, government-devised incentives that produce inequality deserve criticism on a more 
fundamental basis. The private sector remains, despite efforts to rectify its shortcomings, 
measurably unequal.42 As they currently stand, modern corporations structurally encourage 
women’s underrepresentation. Policymakers therefore have a responsibility to ensure 
that the whistleblowing mechanisms they design avoid reifying the inequalities already 
at work in corporate structures. Policies that harness private action and encourage 
compliance through internal structures have the potential for success. But moving away 
from government regulation also risks that the quasi-enforcement compliance mechanisms 
that develop in private firms will replicate existing bias in the private sector instead of 
accurately reflecting the range of voices we expect in a democratic system. 
Existing research shows that gender and culture affect potential whistleblowers’ 
responses to whistleblower policy options, such as financial incentives, confidentiality 
assurances, and establishing a duty to report.43 Applying these findings, any state law on 
this topic will interact with individual-level employee characteristics to affect the nature 
and quality of whistleblower reports. 
II.   Whistleblower Design: Divergent Effects of Legal Mechanisms and 
Observed Misconduct Based on Demographic Differences
Academic research and experience with existing law indicate that whistleblower 
mechanisms create divergent effects, and results differ based on the type of misconduct 
potential whistleblowers observe and on demographic differences among whistleblowers. 
The workplace, its rules, and its dynamics are unavoidably linked to relationships and 
context inside and outside corporate offices. As states and the federal government seek to 
push regulatory efforts into the private sector with whistleblower policies, policy designers 
should be cognizant of the gender dynamics onto which whistleblower rules and incentives 
are grafted. Whistleblowing in any workplace is, at its heart, an exercise of the employee’s 
42   Research shows, for example, that in 2006 women held 14.6% of all Fortune 500 board seats. Kevin 
Campbell & Antonio Minguez-Vera, Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Financial Performance, 83 
J. bUS. eTHicS 435, 438 (2008); see also Cindy A. Schipani et. al., Women and the New Corporate Governance: 
Pathways for Obtaining Positions of Corporate Leadership, 65 md. L. Rev. 504, 511 (2006).
43   See generally Feldman & Lobel, Incentives Matrix, supra note 1 (engaging in an extensive survey study 
to ascertain the effects of context, employees’ characteristics, and severity of the observed misconduct on the 
likelihood of employees to blow the whistle, given various legal mechanisms). 
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“voice” in the face of company misconduct.44 
Yuval Feldman and Orly Lobel provide one of the most comprehensive examinations 
of the interaction between gender and the design of whistleblower laws. Their work appears 
throughout this Note’s discussion of how to incorporate relevant research into policy design, 
and their insight that “important interactions between different types of legal incentives and 
the demographics of individuals for which they are designed, including gender, levels of 
income, job status, and professional roles,”45 shape the potential whistleblowers’ decision-
making guides this Note’s arguments. 
The following analysis limits itself to questions about the way that women as opposed 
to men respond to whistleblower legal mechanisms. It is therefore extremely narrow, as 
the foundational idea that multiple demographic realities affect individuals’ responses to 
the law demands that policymakers pay attention to characteristics beyond gender as well. 
Nevertheless, isolating the gender effects of whistleblower design can serve as a first step 
in understanding the interaction between individual-level characteristics and whistleblower 
policies. At the same time, it is evident that a more comprehensive inquiry that includes, 
for example, an analysis of race, class, and sexual orientation effects, would be necessary 
for a more complete picture.
The nature of whistleblowing makes field studies about the choice to report misconduct 
unworkable. However, researchers aiming to evaluate whistleblower behavior have turned 
to experimental studies in which they present a sample of workers with a series of conditions 
related to misconduct and/or other aspects of a workplace situation.46 Researchers then ask 
about what the interviewee’s response would be to the observed misconduct and make their 
conclusions based on the responses of large samples. 
A.   Increasing the Ethical Salience of Financial Fraud
The nature of the observed misconduct is one important dimension of whistleblowing. 
For example, research has compared financial fraud to other kinds of misconduct, such as 
sexual harassment, and found that the internal ethical motivation that financial wrongdoing 
44   Alexander & Prasad, supra note 2, at 1071. 
45   Feldman & Lobel, Incentives Matrix, supra note 1, at 1187–89. 
46   Granvile King III, The Effects of Interpersonal Closeness and Issue Seriousness on Blowing the Whistle, 
34 J. bUS. cOmm. 419 (1997) (measuring nurses’ likelihood of reporting misconduct, studying the effects of 
misconduct’s severity and interpersonal closeness); Feldman & Lobel, Incentives Matrix, supra note 1.  
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inspires is much less intense than the motivation more morally reprehensible conduct 
spurs.47 Where a moral reaction will lead to whistleblowing on its own, financial incentives 
become more relevant when the internal or ethical motivation associated with misconduct 
is lower.48 Even within categories of misconduct that are inherently higher-stakes, research 
has indicated that severity matters to a would-be whistleblower’s likelihood to report.49 
One study that focused on nurses’ likelihood of reporting errors in their workplace—where 
mistakes and wrongdoing are always related to a patient’s health—showed that “issue 
seriousness” had a statistically significant effect on whether employees tended to report to 
their supervisors.50
Financial fraud inspires a weaker ethical reaction, as demonstrated in Feldman and 
Lobel’s 2010 experimental survey. That survey of 2,000 people further indicated that 
monetary incentives could be useful as an instrument to encourage reporting where inherent 
ethical motivation was low.51 Even as compared to creating a duty to report (another 
mechanism for encouraging whistleblowing that the study evaluates),52 they found that 
“when internal motivation is missing, for example when the misconduct is perceived as 
low in severity, external incentives mattered much more.”53
Experience with federal precursors to the Dodd-Frank Act aligns with that evidence. 
The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, which applied to 
insider trading only (as opposed to the broader range of finance-related conduct that the 
47   Feldman & Lobel, Incentives Matrix, supra note 1, at 1202–04. 
48   Id. 
49   King, supra note 46, at 424.
50   The two types of nurse misconduct that participants considered were failing to wash hands between 
patient visits (the less serious conduct) and administering the incorrect medicine to patients (the more 
serious conduct). Also, note that while seriousness mattered to employees’ tendency to report to their direct 
supervisors, King did not find that seriousness was significant to reporting to peers (other staff nurses) or to 
administrators. Seriousness also did not prove significant to the likelihood of retaliation. Id. at 429 (“Results 
were not significant for reporting the wrongdoing to other staff nurses, to administrators, and the likelihood of 
retaliation.”).
51   Feldman & Lobel, Incentives Matrix, supra note 1, at 1202–04.
52   Id. (The study compared four types of whistleblower policy: (1) Anti-retaliation Protection; (2) Duty to 
Report; (3) Liability Fines; and (4) Monetary Incentives.)
53   Orly Lobel, Linking Prevention, Detection, and Whistleblowing: Principles for Designing Effective 
Reporting Systems, 54 S. Tex. L. Rev. 37, 46 (2012) [hereinafter Lobel, Linking].
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federal Dodd-Frank Act covers), had a ten percent award cap for whistleblowers.54 The 
law resulted in only seven payments to five claimants over two decades.55 The Dodd-
Frank Act, the provisions of which allow for a greater recovery relative to the penalty that 
comes out of the whistleblowing, has seen much stronger activity under its whistleblower 
provisions. Eight whistleblowers received awards totaling millions of dollars in 2011 alone 
under Dodd-Frank.56 The law’s structure, which allows for between ten and thirty percent 
recovery, has been able to capitalize on the experience and knowledge of employees in a 
way that the 1988 Act did not. Something about the structure of Dodd-Frank re-shapes 
potential whistleblowers’ calculi of cost versus benefit more effectively than the more 
conservative, less flexible earlier program. 
The general agreement that monetary awards are the “most effective legislative 
incentive” available to lawmakers reflects the higher-level research findings that Feldman 
and Lobel, as well as others, report.57 We should note, however, that the potential effects 
of a whistleblower protection law go beyond a mechanism’s mere presence or absence. 
As Bishara et al. point out, we should attribute the success of the FCA to the structure 
that the law provides for reporting and recovery. The FCA’s incentive structure cannot be 
isolated from its other features, including: (1) the certainty of the award, (2) the clarity of 
the whistleblower procedures, and (3) the degree of control that the whistleblower has over 
the case.58 
Furthermore, introducing and passing a new piece of legislation has an expressive 
value.59 A law that directs government attention and resources, not only at controlling 
financial fraud but specifically at encouraging and rewarding individuals to blow the whistle 
when they observe that conduct, both emphasizes the severity of corporate wrongdoing and 
54   Howard M. Friedman, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 68 n.c. L. 
Rev. 465, 479 (1990). 
55   Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Report No. 474, Assessment of the SEC’s Bounty 
Program 5 (2010).
56   SEC, 2015 AnnUAL RepORT TO cOngReSS On THe dOdd-FRAnk wHiSTLebLOweR pROgRAm at 10, https://www. 
sec.gov/files/owb-annual-report-2015.pdf [perma.cc/ZC2B-S85J] [hereinafter SEC, 2015 AnnUAL RepORT].
57   Bishara et al., supra note 4, at 93.
58   Id. 
59   Feldman & Lobel, Incentives Matrix, supra note 1, at 1183 n.203 (observing that individuals respond to 
signals in the existing legal system to determine what their duties are as citizens and to anticipate what level 
of social support they can expect for steps they choose to take). For the purposes of this Note, this bears on the 
choice to report corporate wrongdoing and receive a monetary reward for that contribution.
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bolsters the legitimacy of whistleblowers who make the choice to report and gain a reward 
from it. The potential norm-shaping influence of attaching a whistleblower provision to 
financial fraud is illustrated by the aforementioned research and experience with money 
incentive structures. On one hand, a whistleblower provision would emphasize the 
importance of financial misconduct in a way that has the potential to increase the internal 
ethical motivation that Feldman and Lobel observed as “low” for financial fraud reporting.60 
Additionally, passing and enforcing such a provision would support whistleblowing in the 
face of popular ambivalence about the role of whistleblowers in supporting compliance. 
As discussed in Part I, public responses to whistleblowing vary widely, and whistleblowers 
may be praised or vilified. The existence of a state-level Dodd-Frank statute has the 
potential to guide reactions to the whistleblowers who report financial frauds, increasing 
the likelihood that their activity will be received as morally valuable and not merely as 
a bid for attention or monetary gain. This second piece—related to the expressive effect 
of the law on reactions from peers, based on research related to women in the workplace 
described below—has particular potential to affect women who consider whistleblowing.
B.   Gender and Whistleblowing in Academic Research and in Public Discussion
The question of whether and how women and men respond differently when they 
observe misconduct in the workplace has been of interest to social science researchers and 
popular commentators alike. Given the strong, often conflicting, emotional reactions that 
the public has to whistleblowing and the visible nature of a few high-profile instances of 
whistleblowing, the topic can be particularly vulnerable to stereotype and assumption. But, 
given the highly social nature of the choice to blow the whistle, the interaction between 
formal academic inquiry and armchair commentary on this topic is particularly interesting 
and potentially revealing.
1.   Conclusions from Academic Research
As a starting point, it is worth looking at research that deals with whistleblowing patterns 
and gender overall, without inquiring into the effects of particular legal mechanisms. The 
work is mixed, indicating multiple possible narratives, which sometimes conflict.61 A 
satisfying answer to the question of whether men or women are, on the whole, more likely 
to blow the whistle does not emerge from retrospective work on actual whistleblowing that 
has taken place, or from survey results that ask employees about how they would react in a 
60   Id. at 1207.
61   See id. at 1177 for the authors’ overview of some of the existing research and possible explanations. 
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theoretical situation where they observe misconduct. Some work has indicated that internal 
whistleblowers are more likely to be women than men or, along the same lines, that when 
external whistleblowing occurs, men are more likely to carry it out.62 But other research 
disagrees with, or at least complicates, that observed trend. Some research indicates women 
are more likely to report to a specific and important type of external contact than men are: 
law-enforcement.63 The inconclusive results of existing work underscore the complicated 
nature of explaining whistleblowing choices. 
Furthermore, social science’s methods for studying behavior suffer from particularly 
acute limitations when dealing with whistleblowing. Surveys and case studies that address 
individuals who did blow the whistle on misconduct encounter “recall difficulties” 
when attempting to measure differences in whistleblowers’ experiences with reporting.64 
Experimental surveys with carefully developed, extensive, and representative response 
populations65 provide a valuable tool for studying employee responses to legal mechanisms. 
However, when the surveys are specifically geared toward culling a representative and 
varied sample, the study responses may not align with behaviors that are most relevant in 
the workplace. From a social science perspective, this mismatch is not problematic, but 
policymakers could find themselves concerned that research indications may not counsel 




62   Research about women’s reporting is mixed overall. See, e.g., Joyce Rothschild & Terance D. Miethe, 
Whistle-Blower Disclosures and Management Retaliation, 26 wORk & OccUpATiOnS 107, 113 (1999), http://
citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.472.203&rep=rep1&type=pdf [perma.cc/724Y-VL7Y] 
(indicating that internal whistleblowers were more likely to be women). Other studies showed men were more 
likely to blow the whistle on the whole. See, e.g., Marcia P. Miceli et al., Blowing the Whistle on Data Fudging: 
A Controlled Field Experiment, 21 J. AppLied SOc. pSycHOL. 271, 288–89 (1991); Randi L. Sims & John P. 
Keenan, Predictors of External Whistleblowing: Organizational and Intrapersonal Variables, 17 J. bUS. eTHicS 
411, 418 (1998).
63   Feldman & Lobel, Incentives Matrix, supra note 1, at 1177 (citing Feldman & Lobel, Decentralized 
Enforcement, supra note 41).
64   Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Whistle-Blowing: Myth and Reality, 22 J. mgmT. 507, 518 (1996) 
(discussing the limitations that come with reliance on case studies and noting “obvious recall difficulties 
associated with this method”).
65   See, e.g., Feldman & Lobel, Incentives Matrix, supra note 1, at 1189 for a description of a sample survey 
created by the firm Zoomerang.
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One narrative that clearly emerges from the research, however, is that women and 
men respond to whistleblower legal mechanisms in systematically different ways.66 
Across the board, women “were motivated to report by different factors than men,”67 and 
they engaged in particular types of reporting with more frequency. One study that Lobel 
describes included a finding that women are more likely to act based on observing the 
misconduct themselves, rather than collecting evidence that wrongdoing occurred. But 
women were less likely to confront the person committing the wrongdoing directly. Rather, 
they were more comfortable reporting to a third party (either internally or externally).68 
Particularly relevant to this inquiry, women proved more likely than men to report on 
“corporate misconduct,” and that pattern persisted across the range of legal mechanisms 
the survey studied.69
In terms of legal mechanisms at play, women valued anti-retaliation provisions and 
confidentiality assurances more than men did. Women also responded more strongly to 
establishing a duty to report. In whistleblower and compliance law, duties to report have 
largely been limited to individuals in certain professions. When the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
imposed a duty to report in cases of financial fraud, for example, that duty was limited 
to lawyers.70 The survey, however, did not frame the duty requirement as an imposition 
connected with a certain status or profession. Still, women proved significantly more likely 
to report wrongdoing when a duty was present. Men, on the other hand, reported that they 
cared more about financial incentives as opposed to women.71
A law that focuses primarily on monetary incentives, which likely motivates mostly 
men to report financial wrongdoing, is not inherently unjust to women in the workplace. 
However, taking a finer-grained look at the role that women tend to play in whistleblowing, 
as well as understanding what factors and circumstances explain the observed divergences 
in the way women and men respond to policies, would allow drafters to better appreciate 
how a potential law would fit into the existing social and legal dynamics of the workplace.
66   Id. at 1196. 
67   Lobel, Linking, supra note 53, at 49.
68   Id. 
69   Id.
70   Id. at 45 n.36. 
71  Feldman & Lobel, Incentives Matrix, supra note 1, at 1196–97 (“Whereas men care significantly more 
than women about the size of the monetary reward, women are more incentivized by antiretaliation protections 
and legal duties.”).
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In pursuing that goal, it is useful to be aware of the murkiness in these academic works’ 
conclusions about actual patterns in whistleblowing, particularly as juxtaposed with popular 
reports about internal and external reporting of organizational misconduct. In translating 
whistleblower experiences into news media, accounts of female whistleblowers and 
discussions of gender and whistleblowing have tended to fall into the trap of understanding 
behavior through the lens of either simplified stereotype or idealized, self-sacrificing 
morality.
2.   Women Whistleblowers in the News
Some of the most notable and newsworthy examples of whistleblowing in recent history 
deal specifically with female whistleblowers. In 2002, Coleen Rowley (an FBI attorney), 
Cynthia Cooper (a former employee at WorldCom), and Sherron Watkins (a vice president 
at Enron) each gained notoriety for reporting misconduct at their high-profile organizations, 
and TIME magazine also highlighted the three as their “Persons of the Year.”72 
The nature of TIME’s yearly report lends itself to simplification and storytelling 
over nuance. The article gushes about the women’s choices to blow the whistle, giving 
an idealized account of the “good” kind of whistleblowing: “What we saw in these three 
women was ordinary people from the heartland doing an extraordinary thing, which is telling 
the truth and telling the truth because they believed that telling the truth would improve, 
change, and redeem the institutions they loved so much.”73 But the article also exploited 
popular ideas and stereotypes about women in developing a narrative for understanding 
the action all three whistleblowers took. It’s important to the TIME article’s account that 
the 2002 whistleblowers were “reluctant” to take on public roles.74 The article specifically 
discusses the term “whistleblower” itself. Calling to mind the discussion in Part I above, 
TIME paints the women as concerned about presenting themselves as whistleblowers.75 
The TIME account actively pushes readers away from interpreting its subjects as self-
absorbed or selfish, consistently mixing its praise of the whistleblowers’ reporting with 
reminders that the women have an aversion to the “limelight.”
72   See generally Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 17. 
73   Time Names Whistleblowers as Persons of the Year, cnn (Dec. 23, 2002), http://edition.cnn.com/2002/
US/12/23/time.persons.of.year/ [perma.cc/KF32-9CZN].
74   Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 17.
75   Id. (“[T]wo out of the three hate the term whistle-blower.”).
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 This framing is relevant to our understanding of which kinds of organizational 
participation women feel justified in performing. Specifically, it implicates women’s 
calculations regarding which kinds of participation will have a likely payoff high enough 
to make assuming the risks that come with the behavior worth it—especially in light 
of the widely varying responses a whistleblower’s conduct can inspire. In the article’s 
closing lines, the TIME authors explicitly praise the 2002 whistleblowers for taking on the 
responsibilities and challenges of citizenship with their choice to report. However, when 
the entire piece is infused with the theme that they were quiet, reluctant actors who risked 
more than they gained, the article gives the ultimate impression that the women earn its 
praise only after sufficiently justifying and proving the humility of their motives. 
Magazine and newspaper articles tend to report common tropes in describing women’s 
involvement in whistleblowing. There are a variety of facially satisfying explanations 
that writers posit for understanding women’s involvement in reporting wrongdoing. One 
representative article published in Fortune in 2014 demonstrates that even a focused 
discussion about women whistleblowers can serve to reify stereotypes.76 To its credit, the 
Fortune article avoids making assumptions about women’s absolute rate of participation 
in whistleblowing, calling the activity an “equal opportunity vocation.”77 But, even as it 
notes that “for every Sherron Watkins . . . there’s an Edward Snowden,” at the base of 
the discussion is an assertion that women blow the whistle differently from men, and that 
the divergence is in large part about women’s aversion to notoriety. In terms similar to 
the TIME piece, the article emphasizes that women seek out ways to “operate below the 
radar”78 rather than asserting themselves as active, visible participants in enforcing the law.
It is unclear if Sellers (describing arguments that Sherron Watkins herself has expressed 
regarding whistleblowing) is making the point that women tend to report internally versus 
externally, or if the comment is more qualitative regarding the level of attention women 
reporters seek. Furthermore, if the comment refers to internal as opposed to external 
whistleblowing, that conclusion would be contrary to the Feldman and Lobel study’s 
76   Patricia Sellers, Are Women More Likely Than Men to Be Whistleblowers?, FORTUne (Sept. 30, 2014), 
http://fortune.com/2014/09/30/women-whistleblowers/ [perma.cc/3ZS4-7GD3] (describing three reasons for 
women’s whistleblowing choices as women-specific ways of “tolerat[ing] risk,” a “motherhood gene,” and 
women’s roles as institutional outsiders).
77   Id.; see also Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 17 (recognizing that, despite assumptions about women’s roles 
as organizational outsiders making them more likely to blow the whistle, whistleblowers are, in reality, slightly 
more likely to be men than women). 
78   Sellers, supra note 76. 
Columbia Journal of Gender and law358 35.2
indications that, overall, women were more likely to report to a third party or externally, 
where male respondents were more likely to directly confront the wrongdoer.79
C. The Value of Nuanced Explanations for Women’s Whistleblower 
Participation
Regardless, even if the logic that Sellers and others provide for women whistleblowing 
gives insight, a more complete understanding of how and when the factors that shape 
women’s role in the workplace interact is necessary. These factors range from women’s 
lower tolerance for risk to a “motherhood gene” that inspires women employees to care 
about the weak with greater frequency than their male counterparts.80 When considering 
specific policies, the inadequacy of broadly-sweeping generalizations about women and 
whistleblowing is evident. To understand whether policy design will act on women’s 
whistleblowing motivation, it is essential to have a more detailed understanding of how 
gender differences affect reactions to policy. Existing research leaves many questions open, 
but work so far does give us an opportunity to start thinking about how a law’s mechanisms 
would act on women employees in the financial services industry. 
1.   Explaining the Variation in Whistleblowing Between Women and Men
One factor that writers emphasize is that women often remain, even today, “institutional 
outsiders” in corporate workplaces. The statistics that describe the modern corporate 
workforce indicate an ongoing disparity. The less-connected status of women in corporate 
workplaces has to do with leadership at the highest levels. Only 9.9% of corporate offices 
with directly responsibility for budgeting and client relationships are held by women, and 
those are the roles “from which promotions are made to the highest positions.”81 
Features of women’s tenure and relationship to their workplaces are especially important 
to whistleblowing. Women’s patterns of employment tend to include breaks in their time 
in the workforce, often because of family responsibilities. But it is not entirely clear which 
way that idiosyncrasy in employment patterns cuts. On the one hand, Seller’s argument 
indicates that less loyalty to an organization, by reason of a shorter tenure, encourages 
reporting. But Bishara et al. highlight research that tells a different story, explaining that 
“[w]histleblowers are . . . motivated by the desire to put ‘their’ organization back on the 
79   Lobel, Linking, supra note 53, at 49. 
80   Sellers, supra note 76.
81   Schipani et al., supra note 42, at 504–05. 
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right track. The literature . . . suggests that longer organizational tenure and higher job 
satisfaction are associated with whistleblowing.”82 
The hierarchies that these general trends create have implications for whistleblowing. 
Regardless of the whistleblower’s gender, reporting (internal or external) happens more 
often when the observed offender is not higher-ranked than the whistleblower (i.e. the 
offender is a peer or subordinate). Apart from the ownership and membership that women 
may feel in a corporation, the numbers come out to make it more likely that an observed 
offense will be by someone higher-ranked than a female observer. It is therefore worth 
noting that the forces that create differences between men’s and women’s responses when 
they observe misconduct might in part be an issue of power dynamics that would factor 
into any relationship with a power differential. When we observe women responding to 
particular legal mechanisms, such as a duty to report, perhaps that pattern would be true of 
lower-ranked individuals across the board. Correcting policies to encourage gender equity 
in participation, therefore, has the potential to equalize participation in other ways—such 
as participation by rank in an organization.
Norms also play a particularly meaningful role in women’s thinking about whether or 
not to blow the whistle. When women talked about their choices in the Feldman and Lobel 
survey, female survey respondents, as opposed to males, were more concerned about social 
norms and more affected by responses from friends and family in determining whether to 
blow the whistle. The question of where they would fit into the whistleblowing typology—a 
hero or a snitch—factors into women’s choices to act at the outset of the experience.
Feldman and Lobel situate this concern about norms in the context of broader costs of 
whistleblowing: “In general, reporting is costly. Whistleblowers fear not only retaliation 
by their employers but the psychological and social consequences of being shunned by 
their coworkers and the community.”83 An explanation that rests on women’s desire to “fly 
under the radar,” such as the one that the Sellers piece suggests, may come from the same 
source that led to Feldman and Lobel’s conclusion. But praising that proclivity as a sign of 
humility forecloses the opportunity to understand how to reckon with women’s relatively 
greater norms-consciousness in efforts to create whistleblower systems that encourage 
equity. 
 
82   Bishara et al., supra note 4, at 60. 
83   Lobel, Linking, supra note 53, at 48. 
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2.   Connecting the Proposed Law to Research
A state level law, like the Dodd-Frank Act, could impact this norms-consciousness. As 
discussed above, law has the potential to “mak[e] a particular behavior salient.”84 American 
culture, while it sometimes praises whistleblowing activity (such as in the cases of the 
TIME 2002 whistleblowers), is often inclined to see reporting as snitching. 
The law draws implicit lines about what kind of reporting is protected, responsible 
citizenship and what kind of reporting is either annoying overreaction or self-interested 
bounty hunting.85 Especially in New York State, the financial services industry has a general 
welfare dimension. The 2008 crisis clarified the dangerousness of questionable conduct at 
the nation’s most prominent and powerful financial institutions. Perhaps it is particularly 
important to seize on this opportunity (while the financial crisis is still in relatively recent 
memory) to bolster the salience of the employee’s role in participating in watchdog 
activities. Indeed, empirical evidence indicates the objective importance corporate 
wrongdoing, which has been estimated to be more costly than common crime.86 But as 
the financial crisis of 2008 becomes a more distant memory, the Trump administration’s 
hostility to Dodd-Frank and other corporate regulation87 can substitute as the “threat” to 
which the legislation is responding. That reframing can elevate whistleblowing to a more 
valuable activity and attenuate the risk among peers and family that women perceive when 
they consider social norms in reporting. 
But a similar result could also come from incorporating a duty to report. When women 
respond to a duty to report in the research, they may be looking for the same kind of social 
support that ethical salience affords. Being able to fall back on a legal duty allows for 
women whistleblowers to play the role of reluctant reporter, bound by a legal requirement, 
not driven by pride or greed. Failing to include a duty to report means that women and men 
alike cannot derive that benefit from the law. 
84   Feldman and Lobel, Incentives Matrix, supra note 1, at 1185 n.215 (citing Richard H. McAdams & 
Janice Nadler, Testing the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance: Expressive Influence in an Experimental 
Hawk/Dove Game, 2 J. empiRicAL LegAL STUd. 87 (2005)).
85   See Heumann, supra note 12, at 56–69 (discussing a proposed typology of whistleblowers). 
86   Bishara et al., supra note 4, at 42–43 (citing The Cost of Crime: Understanding the Financial and 
Human Impact of Criminal Activity: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 69 (2006) 
(statement of Jens Ludwig, Professor, Georgetown Public Policy Institute, Georgetown University), https://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg42938/html/CHRG-109shrg42938.htm [perma.cc/VLY8-H7W3]).
87   Protess & Hirschfeld Davis, supra note 9. 
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III.   Designing a Whistleblower Law: Potential for Success and Risks for 
Women’s Participation
The ultimate goal of whistleblower policy has three elements: deterring, exposing, 
and halting wrongdoing.88 Any effective whistleblower law for New York State needs 
to emphasize the structures that are best positioned to achieve those elements through 
incentives, rather than the traditional regulatory model. However, as the state considers 
ways to move away from regulation toward a system that relies on cooperation from 
private actors in the New Governance mode, it has a responsibility to consider the way 
those structures tend to discriminate against or encourage citizen engagement from female 
and male employees who would be subject to the proposed rules. 
The financial incentives included in the New York State proposal from 2015 have the 
potential to spur reporting, but the incentives the law builds in also have the potential to 
bolster the voices of male potential whistleblowers at the expense of women’s organizational 
participation. The takeaway that should matter most to policymakers from Feldman and 
Lobel’s survey is the conclusion that, “there is no one-size-fits-all solution for policy 
design. Rather, policy makers must consider the characteristics of the target population 
of social enforcers and incentivize them accordingly.”89 The question for policy designers 
should be, then, which “characteristics of the target population” matter. Given the gender 
effects of policy design, they also need to consider how a policy that addresses and seizes 
on characteristics of one segment can de-emphasize the contributions of other populations. 
But a realistic evaluation of gender effects and whistleblowing also needs to recognize 
that there is not a “one-size-fits-all solution” for all women employees either. In any 
workplace, competing identities and pressures shape individuals’ choices. The Feldman 
and Lobel study considered a wide range of survey participants,90 and that range makes it 
valuable for its identified task. However, a policy that is particularly focused at industries—
and industries in a particular state, at that—is concerned with a more narrow set of actors 
who are likely to share cultural characteristics regardless of gender that might affect their 
responses to legal mechanisms.91 
88   Bishara et al., supra note 4, at 43. 
89   Feldman & Lobel, Incentives Matrix, supra note 1, at 1156.
90   Id. at 1189 describes the sample. 
91   Feldman & Lobel, Decentralized Enforcement, supra note 41, at 172–78 (2008) (describing sizable 
differences between the attitudes of employees in the United States and in Israel on topics such as happiness in 
the workplace and social norms to whistleblowing behavior). On a smaller scale, it is reasonable to expect that 
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A.  Monetary Incentives: A Realistic Choice with Drawbacks
On the whole, the monetary incentive structure in the proposed law is a realistic 
response to the current state of the industry and a reasonable strategy in light of existing 
research. But declining to include a duty to report amounts to a choice not to emphasize 
types of reporting that research indicates women respond to strongly.
1.  Benefits and Concerns, Given Current Research
As discussed above, research indicates that financial misconduct is an area where 
financial incentives have room to function as intended, given the lack of moral response to 
this kind of misconduct. Given that the “large majority of those who reported misconduct 
did it because of their ethical belief that they were doing ‘the right thing,’”92 this speaks 
powerfully in favor of including such provisions in the law.  The law’s ability to focus and 
re-shape salience is relevant. But a duty to report incentivizes women to blow the whistle. 
In fact, when the Feldman and Lobel study presented women participants with misconduct 
and a duty to report but no reward, women said they would blow the whistle at a higher rate 
than when they were presented with a low reward.93 The results were directly inverse for 
the men. Men were less likely to report when presented with a duty than with a low reward. 
Information about the proposed New York Financial Frauds Whistleblower Act indicates 
that its design revolved around a sliding scale for potential whistleblower recoveries. As 
in Dodd-Frank, a whistleblower recovering under the proposed law could have recovered 
between ten to thirty percent of the award New York State would win in a successful suit. 
There was an additional requirement that a case lead to at least one million dollars in 
penalties for a whistleblower to recover any money at all—an aspect that demonstrated a 
focus on high-value cases.94 The Attorney General’s office identified high-value cases as a 
goal, in keeping with rhetoric about Dodd-Frank and the IRS’s whistleblower program.95 
This approach is not novel. The IRS whistleblower program, established in 2006, has the 
explicit goal of focusing on “high-value targets,” and that commitment is conscious and 
differences in culture might show themselves within the U.S. as well.
92   Lobel, Linking, supra note 53, at 47.
93   Both these groups were given circumstances where the misconduct inspired low ethical motivation. 
Feldman & Lobel, Incentives Matrix, supra note 1, at 1197.
94   Press Release, A.G. Schneiderman Proposes Bill, supra note 7.
95   Id.
Columbia Journal of Gender and law 36335.2
ongoing; Congress rejected an amendment that would have reduced threshold claim of 
potential indebtedness to $20,000 from $200,000.96 Accounts of the IRS design reflect 
skepticism of whistleblower motives generally, and the ambivalence that government 
officials themselves feel about these actors.97 
To the extent that such an approach recognizes public mistrust of whistleblowing, 
designing a policy to ensure that rewards can go only to people with claims that look like 
they are worth government time and energy seems rational. However, the research has 
indicated that women are more willing to report whistleblowing when the harm cost is 
lower in terms of dollars and cents than men are when they consider the same violation. 
A law that intentionally incentivizes only higher-value claims therefore risks discouraging 
participation that has proven relatively more prevalent among women. The monetary 
incentives in the law explain just one aspect of a potential whistleblower scheme, and 
internal avenues of reporting would still be available and encouraged. However, especially 
in light of the possible explanations for a divergence in women’s whistleblowing behavior 
as opposed to their male counterparts, the suggestion that the law’s implicit legitimation of 
whistleblowing behavior does not reach lower-value reporting could serve to depress this 
type of whistleblowing. 
2.  Recommendations for a Design that Considers Current Research
Writing a duty to report into the law would incorporate a legal mechanism that 
women respond to particularly well, and the political landscape provides an opportunity 
to introduce the mechanism into the Financial Frauds Whistleblower Act. It is true that no 
such requirement appears in Dodd-Frank or in state FCAs, and duties to report financial 
fraud have been limited to certain professions.98 However, while policymakers may believe 
that political support for a duty to report in this sector seems difficult to rally, a considered 
evaluation of the option reveals potential avenues for maximizing the incentive calculations 
that research indicates lead women employees to respond to a duty. 
In the current political climate, a potential New York state law serves a distinct role 
from the one Dodd-Frank was designed to fill. Especially now that reports suggest the 
96   Feldman & Lobel, Incentives Matrix, supra note 1, at 1170 (citing Dennis J. Ventry, Whistleblowers and 
Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAx LAw. 357, 383 (2008)). Statements about IRS program point to ensuring legitimacy of 
claims, and discouraging “weak claims and vindictive cases among neighbors.” Id.
97   Id. at 1154. 
98   Bishara et al., supra note 4, at 67.
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federal law will be rolled back in the coming years,99 a New York law focused on financial 
fraud reporting would no longer be state-level implementation of national policy. Rather, 
the law would more closely fit a pattern of “blue-state federalism,” which gives it greater 
license to be creative or bold than it might have had as a mini-Dodd Frank. A duty to report, 
in addition to codifying a more equitable set of mechanisms, affirms the seriousness of 
financial misconduct and the active role the state is committed to playing in monitoring 
and enforcing its standards. 
Even if lawmakers decline to include a duty in the law, officials will have the opportunity 
to include language related to responsibility or informal duty (to fellow New Yorkers or to 
the financial services system more generally) in its communications to the public and to 
employees about the law. 
The inclusion of monetary incentives ultimately appears to be the right option for a 
state whistleblower law. In addition to the ethical salience points addressed above, it also 
bolsters the deterrence goals of a whistleblowing policy. Evidence indicates that while 
people under-estimate the centrality of financial incentives in their own decision-making, 
they expect it to play a larger role in the choices that those around them make.100 Financial 
incentives therefore serve a deterring function beyond the actual reports that occur. Insofar 
as would-be wrongdoers perceive that monetary incentives have greater importance in 
would-be whistleblowers’ decision-making than they actually do, they have the potential 
to limit misconduct ex ante.
The proposed law includes confidentiality and anti-retaliation provisions, mechanisms 
which, research indicates, women privilege in their choices to report observed misconduct.101 
These aspects are valuable and should be central to the design. However, anti-retaliation 
in letter only will not be enough to effectively change behavior. Experience under Dodd-
Frank shows that ongoing enforcement of employee-protective provisions is necessary.
Rule 21F-17(a) enforcement was a public focus of the SEC’s Office of the Whistle Blower 
(OWB) in 2015.102 Just recently, the OWB achieved a thirty-percent award in the first 
99   Protess & Hirschfeld Davis, supra note 9.
100  Feldman & Lobel, supra note 1, at 1156.
101  Id. at 1197 (showing that women in the study spoke about protection and confidentiality more frequently 
than men).
102   SEC, 2015 AnnUAL RepORT, supra note 56, at 2 (“Assessing confidentiality agreements for compliance 
with Rule 21F-17(a) will continue to be a top priority for OWB into Fiscal Year 2016.”).
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anti-retaliation enforcement action that it has taken, Capital Management, Inc.103 The 
employer’s retaliation did not include discharge, but the retaliation was obvious, including 
changing the whistleblower’s job function and “withdrawing supervisory responsibilities,” 
as well as “otherwise marginalizing” her.104 Because encouraging whistleblowing revolves 
around individuals’ calculations, anti-retaliation provisions will need to be well-publicized 
and aggressively enforced. 
B.  The Importance of Social and Cultural Context in the Regulated Industry
Women’s concerns and different responses to policy do not come out of essential 
differences in workplace attitudes. Rather, thoughtful whistleblower policy that takes 
into account gender differences turns on the “tripartite interaction between the reporting 
individual, the detected misconduct in an institutional setting, and the regulatory regime 
that defines the contours of legality.”105 The law deals specifically with financial services 
and insurance industries in New York. To the extent that this law interacts with existing 
culture in New York finance to make whistleblowing more accepted and encouraged, it 
could ease the risks that women consider when determining whether to blow the whistle. It 
requires a consideration of those industries and factors specifically. The role of the financial 
crisis in local awareness and the pre-existing social norms in the industry are two central 
aspects of that inquiry.
The Feldman and Lobel study found that women tended to care more about the reaction 
from family and friends when they considered reporting.106 The potential power of a New 
York state law to create more salience around the issue, as discussed earlier, bodes well 
for transforming peers’ reactions. Furthermore, following the 2008 crisis, the health of 
the financial system seems to resemble health and safety policy areas in terms of their 
importance to citizens’ well-being, particularly for New York state workers.107 Passing a 
law that targets whistleblowing in financial fraud could serve as public validation of 
the dangers that go with financial frauds, codifying an approach that equates the value 
103  Capital Management, Inc. and Candace King Weir, Exchange Act Release No. 74826, 111 SEC Docket 
1808, 2015 WL 1907622 (Apr. 28, 2015).
104  SEC, 2015 AnnUAL RepORT, supra note 102, at 11.
105  Lobel, Linking, supra note 53, at 48.
106  Feldman & Lobel, Incentives Matrix, supra note 1, at 1196.
107  Id. at 1185 (“[L]aw can induce compliance by making a particular behavior salient.”) (citing McAdams 
& Nadler, supra note 84, at 108–18). 
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of reporting those frauds to reporting the violations that the state already protects with 
anti-retaliation provisions. This transformation in social norms could conceivably make 
whistleblowers, particularly women, more confident that they will have the support of 
friends and family. 
But policymakers also need to examine the circumstances and mechanisms that 
result in women’s tendency to weigh friends’ and families’ reactions more heavily than 
men do. An effective inquiry into those effects raises questions about the specific habits, 
inclinations, and incentives of women working in the New York financial services industry. 
To extrapolate from research on other industries would not only essentialize women workers 
but also risk misguided conclusions that fail to consider how the finance workforce may 
behave differently.
Stanford University’s Clayman Institute has offered interesting suggestions about 
how women’s priorities in the workplace develop. An ongoing project has found that 
women’s feedback and evaluations from managers focus on personality traits rather than 
on technical skills more often than men’s reviews do.108 The findings indicate that “women 
are systematically less likely to receive specific feedback tied to outcomes, both when they 
receive praise and when the feedback is developmental,” and that their feedback is less often 
tied to tangible business outcomes.109 If women believe that their successes, contributions, 
and job security primarily depend on their ability to get along with coworkers and not on 
their substantive, technical contributions, then they may hesitate to challenge others in the 
workplace. When women come away from reviews with the sense that their strengths have 
to do with “communication” and teamwork, the good faith they risk by challenging their 
coworkers and superiors is a more central aspect of their job success. 
Are those observed patterns present in the New York financial services industry? If 
not, were they central to the experiences of women in the Feldman and Lobel study? Is 
it reasonable to think that the industries in question here are so geared toward business 
outcomes that these patterns do not occur in banking? Or perhaps large corporations, as 
opposed to information technology companies, have more standardized review processes 
that protect against the kind of gendered feedback the Clayman Institute describes? In 
effect, the industry in question can reasonably have its own culture, which would lead 
108  Shelley Correll & Caroline Simard, Research: Vague Feedback is Holding Women Back, HARv. bUS. 
Rev. (Apr. 29, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/04/research-vague-feedback-is-holding-women-back [perma.cc/
EWE8-P36K].
109  Id. 
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women to act either less differently from their male counterparts or to act according to 
different patterns altogether. 
Other explanations for understanding women’s involvement in whistleblowing, such 
as the factors that push them toward blowing the whistle and the ones that make them less 
likely to report in certain circumstances, also need to be considered in light of the specific 
circumstances of the financial services industry. Hypotheses range from the structural, 
such as women’s shorter work histories which result in less attachment to firms and being 
organizational “outsiders,” to the moral, such as a greater sensitivity to unfairness and 
higher internal levels of moral judgment.110 For each possible explanation, there are both 
anecdotal challenges and compelling logical counterarguments. The TIME 2002 article on 
whistleblowers, for example, reports that its subjects disagree with the theory that women 
blow the whistle because they are more likely to be outsiders. In fact, the piece described 
them each as “[t]he truest of true believers . . . ever faithful to the idea that where they 
worked was a place that served the wider world in some way.”111 It suggests that women’s 
loyalty—rather than a lack of connection to their institutions—in fact led them to report 
wrongdoing.
But more systematic criticisms are also evident. Does the outsider hypothesis, for 
example, apply to those who have worked in the same industry for an extended period 
of time but in multiple firms? Additionally, if we take seriously the suggestion that 
women’s experiences make them more sensitive to injustice, experiences with the norms 
and standards of an industry will surely affect any professional’s conception of what is 
and is not “justice.” The choice to blow the whistle is an individual one, and women’s 
relationships to norms, power, and value judgments are linked to the careers paths they 
have already taken.
Given that the proposed law would address specific industries, policymakers should 
consider that the factors leading women and men alike into these workplaces could affect 
their company loyalty and moral judgment. Furthermore, as workplaces change, both in 




110  Schipani et al., supra note 42, at 508.
111  Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 17.
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CONCLUSION
From the available information on the proposed New York law, evidence indicates that 
it is well-crafted to encourage employees who observe misconduct to bring their reports to 
external enforcement officials. However, the law’s design capitalizes on male employees’ 
patterns of reaction to misconduct (i.e. privileging financial incentives in responding to 
misconduct) and does not emphasize incentives and approaches that have been shown to 
inspire women employees specifically to blow the whistle.112 At the same time, the law’s 
potential to affect social norms in the financial services industry in New York means that it 
could ease concerns about social risks, which research shows are particularly concerning 
to women would-be whistleblowers. 
Despite important open questions about the New York financial services industry 
as its own culture, the existing research about women’s participation in whistleblowing 
provides enough insight for dedicated policymakers to craft a law with gender equity 
in mind. While New York’s current proposed design reflects valid policy choices, the 
historical underrepresentation of women in business should encourage policy makers to 
evaluate the effects of the monetary incentives plan it has proposed and include a duty to 
report in the legislation. Many of the structural explanations that researchers point to in 
explaining women whistleblowers’ choices, such as a lack of women in leadership roles 
and an intensified risk of retaliation because of acting against gender norms,113 are at least 
potentially present in the industries the proposed law would touch. 
As New York looks at the political and policy landscape of the Trump administration, 
it has an opportunity to stake out a position that not only reasserts the importance of 
regulating corporate misconduct but also meaningfully considers the value of diverse 
voices in regulation and compliance. Summoning the political will to pass a state-level law 
that protects and rewards financial fraud whistleblowing while intentionally encouraging 
participation across demographic groups is essential to codifying a more progressive 
regulatory framework.
112  See Lobel, Linking, supra note 53, at 49 (“[W]ith regard to the effectiveness of different legal mechanisms 
or incentives, while men care significantly more than women about the size of the monetary reward, women 
care more about protection against retaliation, as well as the imposition of a legal duty.”).
113  Rehg, supra note 1, at 235 (describing a significant increase in the likelihood that a whistleblower will 
experience retaliation when she is a woman and positing that whistleblowers acting in an assertive manner, 
against female stereotypes, explains that differential finding).
